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Summary
The response brief reveals that the standard of review is dispositive. The district
court entered summary judgment on seven different causes of action1 on the sole ground
that Stevens-Henager provided no evidence to create a disputed issue of material fact
concerning damages. Under the correct standard of review, ^his court not only assumes
liability but also draws all reasonable inferences concerning damages in the light most
favorable to Stevens-Henager—the nonmoving party. If there is any disputed fact
concerning whether Stevens-Henager was damaged, then summary judgment was
inappropriate. While the response brief initially acknowledges the correct standard of
review, its analysis draws all inferences in the light least favorable to Stevens-Henager,
the opposite of what the standard requires.
Under the correct standard of review, Stevens-Henager provided ample evidence
that it was damaged when Eagle Gate (i) engaged in predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager
employees, (ii) had those employees steal computer files from Stevens-Henager and
corrupt Stevens-Henager's files rendering its data (contact information for potential
students) unusable, and then (iii) used those stolen files to recruit new students for itself.
Stevens-Henager provided specific evidence of numerous categories of damages: (i) lost
productivity due to the loss of experienced employees; (ii) costs of hiring and training
less experienced and less productive employees; (iii) costs of advertising and marketing
rendered ineffective when Eagle Gate misappropriated the fruits of that advertising and

1

Stevens-Henager sought damages for (i) breach of contract} (ii) violation of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act; (iii) interference with contractual relations; (iv) interference
with prospective economic relations; (v) violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act; (vi) unfair competition; and (vii) civil conspiracy, (R. 1-30.)
1

marketing; (iv) effects of reduced morale at two campuses; and (v) lost tuition payments
from students who otherwise would have attended Stevens-Henager. (R. 3332-35.)
While Stevens-Henager did not precisely quantify these categories of damages,
Eagle Gate recognizes in the response brief—as it must—that quantification at the
summary judgment stage is not required under Utah law. (Resp. Br. at 28-30.) In other
words, evidence that a defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of damages is
sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion directed only at damages. StevensHenager provided more than enough evidence that Eagle Gate's illegal conduct
proximately caused damages to preclude summary judgment.
Recognizing that Stevens-Henager provided sufficient non-expert testimony of its
damages, Eagle Gate quotes Stevens-Henager's counsel out of context to suggest it was
undisputed that all damages required expert testimony. While Stevens-Henager's counsel
acknowledged the importance of expert testimony to establish some damages—e.g.,
quantification of certain lost profits—Stevens-Henager maintained in its summary
judgment papers and at the hearing that the testimony of three non-expert witnesses was
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. (R. 3332-35; 3574:14.) Most obviously,
"specialized knowledge" is unnecessary to establish that Eagle Gate's predatory hiring of
valuable Stevens-Henager employees caused damage to Stevens-Henager.
As for the three subsequent orders that are based, in part, on the entry of summary
judgment, this court should vacate those orders without prejudice to permit the district
court to consider whether to enter the same three rulings in the absence of the erroneous
summary judgment ruling. For these reasons, this court should vacate all four orders.

2

Argument
The primary issue on appeal is whether Stevens-Henager provided evidence of
damages sufficient to preclude summary judgment. It did. In light of the response brief,
it is important to become clear on a few points, which are dispositive.
First, because Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment was based upon its
contention that Stevens-Henager could not prove "any damages," (R. 3155), summary
judgment was inappropriate if Stevens-Henager provided any evidence of damages. For
that reason, Eagle Gate's argument that Stevens-Henager could not prove damages
because it provided no expert testimony is beside the point unless all damages outlined by
Stevens-Henager require expert testimony. Yet Eagle Gate does not establish that expert
testimony was necessary to establish all damages—e.g., lost productivity of a key
employee or costs of marketing efforts made ineffective by Eagle Gate's illegal
conduct—but instead suggests that Stevens-Henager represerited that expert testimony
was required to establish all damages in this case. (Resp. Br. at 25-26.) As demonstrated
below, Stevens-Henager made no such sweeping representation. Instead, StevensHenager provided non-expert testimony in its papers opposing summary judgment and
cited that same non-expert testimony to the district court at thp summary judgment
hearing. Expert testimony was not required to establish all damages.
Second, as Eagle Gate correctly acknowledged in the response brief (Resp. Br. at
28-39), to preclude summary judgment Utah law required Stevens-Henager only to
provide evidence that Eagle Gate's illegal conduct proximately caused damages, not to
quantify those damages. As demonstrated below, Stevens-Henager provided evidence
that Eagle Gate's conduct was the proximate cause of numerous categories of damages.
3

Third, contrary to how the response brief construes Stevens-Henager's evidence of
damages (Resp. Br. at 29-38), in reviewing an order granting summary judgment this
court views 'the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party," and affirms only if there exists "no genuine issue as
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Sohm v. Dixie Eve Ctr., 2007 UT App 235, % 13, 166 P.3d 614. Construing evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party furthers the important "general judicial
policy that favors a trial on the merits when there is some doubt as to the propriety of a
summary judgment." King v. Searle Pharm., Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864-65 (Utah 1992).
In the end, the non-expert testimony showing that Stevens-Henager was damaged
by Eagle Gate's illegal conduct is sufficient to defeat summary judgment and preclude
Eagle Gate from escaping all liability for its illegal acts. This court should reverse.
I.

Stevens-Henager Provided Evidence of Its Damages
Under Utah law, "thin" evidence of proximate cause precludes summary

judgment. Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, <| 33, 116 P.3d 323. For example,
evidence that illegal conduct increased the price of real property—even without evidence
of how much the price increased—is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Id.
Evidence that medical malpractice caused loss of vision—even without evidence of the
extent of vision loss or damages resulting from that loss—^-is sufficient to preclude
summary judgment. Sohm v. Dixie Eye Or., 2007 UT App 235,ffi[19-20, 166 P.3d 614.
And evidence that an insurance company's failure to defend a lawsuit caused the plaintiff
to incur costs in defending the lawsuit—even without evidence of those costs—is
sufficient to preclude judgment as a matter of law. Renegade Oil, Inc. v. Progressive
4

Cas. Ins. Co., 2004 UT App 356, f l 3 , 101 P.3d 383. Thus, "[w]hen evidence supports a
finding of the fact of damage, i.e., proximate cause, a defendant should not escape
liability because the amount of damage cannot be proved with precision." Sohm, 2007
UT App 235, Tf 20. Escaping liability for illegal acts is what Eagle Gate seeks to do.
Eagle Gate does not challenge that liability stems from its (i) predatory hiring of
Stevens-Henager employees, (ii) having those employees steal computer files from
Stevens-Henager and alter Stevens-Henager5s files so the data (contact information for
prospective students) in the files was unusable, and then (iii) using those stolen files not
only to undermine Stevens-Henager's ability to take advantage of its marketing efforts
but also to recruit new students for itself. Based upon that illegal conduct, StevensHenager provided evidence of a number of categories of damages: (i) lost productivity of
the experienced employees stolen by Eagle Gate; (ii) costs of training less experienced
and less productive employees; (iii) costs associated with ineffective advertising and
marketing when Eagle Gate misappropriated the fruits of that advertising and marketing;
(iv) effects of reduced morale on various campuses; and (v) l0st tuition payments from
students who otherwise would have attended Stevens-Henager. (R. 3332-35.)
The specific evidence of proximate cause is as follows: Carol Gastiger testified
that when Stevens-Henager9 s computer files were altered (phone numbers changed) so it
could not contact prospective students from the targeted "Tongan population," StevensHenager was damaged because it had spent money recruiting that population.2 (R. 3332.)
2

"I think the loss of the Tongan population. I think the mon^y we extended on it. I
mean in very real dollars. And in very non-real dollars, in time and effort. That are not
in specific dollars." (R. 3332.) This testimony shows money spent on marketing to the
Tongan population rendered ineffective by Eagle Gate and presents a jury question to
translate the time and effort spent on that marketing into a darpage amount.
5

Vicki Dewsnup confirmed that the money spent on "advertising and marketing" was
wasted when Eagle Gate misappropriated the student leads the advertising and marketing
had generated.3 (R. 3333.) Ms. Dewsnup also confirmed that Stevens-Henager could not
contact its student leads because Eagle Gate's unlawful conduct had left Stevens-Henager
without "adequate phone numbers."4 (R. 3333.) This evidence of damages is sufficient
to preclude summary judgment.
Carl Barney testified about the costs of having to "rebuild the admissions
department," and Ms. Dewsnup testified about the "loss of employees" stemming from
Eagle Gate's predatory hiring of Stevens-Henager5s admissions director.5 (R. 3333-35.)
Ms. Gastiger testified that Stevens-Henager5 s productivity suffered when Eagle Gate
hired Stevens-Henager5s experienced "Admissions Consullant."6 (R. 3332-33.) This
evidence of damages also is sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
"There's extensive costs incurred in advertising and marketing.55 (R. 3333.)
4
"We continue to use any leads that come into the college from time to time, and with
the loss of adequate phone numbers due to the admissions by Mr. Rogers, it became
difficult, if not impossible, to use our own leads." (R. 3333.)
5
"The cost of hiring and training new people. The efforts to rebuild the admissions
department." (R. 3335.)
6
"I believe that when you lose a very competent Admissions Consultant you lose
production for a period of time. That results in - let's say that I replace Tecia and the
other person starts five people a month. Tecia is averaging eight. That's a total of nine
people in a given three-month period of time, if this other person ever gets as good as
Tecia." (R. 3332.)
That testimony is perhaps the best example of Eagle Gate's construing evidence in the
light least favorable to Stevens-Henager, as Eagle Gate assumes Ms. Gastiger is speaking
in hypotheticals and is not describing damages related to the loss of the experienced
admissions consultant independent of the actual efficiency of the people who did her job
after her departure. (Resp. Br. at 31-32.) Eagle Gate asserts in its response brief that
there is no evidence that Stevens-Henager had to replace the admissions directors, but
Mr. Barney testified that Stevens-Henager had to "rebuild the admissions department,55
which is evidence that someone had to do the job of the former admissions director, a
proposition sufficiently supported by common sense in any event. (R. 3334-35.)
6

Mr. Barney testified about the costs of the "loss of the [student] starts" for "at least
two of the campuses, Provo and Ogden," which resulted froifr the stolen and altered files
and which led to a reduction in "an income stream over three or four years." (R. 333435.) And Ms. Dewsnup and Mr. Barney testified about damage to morale at the
campuses that resulted from altering the files, stealing files, ^nd predatory hiring of the
admissions director.8 (R. 3333-35.) This evidence of damages also is sufficient to
preclude summary judgment.
Eagle Gate attempts to resist this straightforward conclusion by (i) implying that
expert testimony was required for all damages in this case an^ (ii) citing a case holding
that, where expert testimony is necessary to prove damages, failure to provide expert
testimony is fatal. (Resp. Br. at 22-26 (citing Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc.,
2009 UT App 347, \ 23, 222 P.3d 775).) Eagle Gate's argument is beside the point
because (i) expert testimony is not required for all damages in this case, and (ii) counsel
for Stevens-Henager never stated that expert testimony was required for all damages.
First, Eagle Gate has cited no cases—because there are none—that expert
testimony is required to prove damages resulting from, for example, the loss of an
admissions director or costs of marketing rendered ineffective when the fruits of that
marketing were stolen. Expert testimony is not required to establish such damages.

7

"The damage to at least two of the campuses, Provo and Ogden. . . . The decline of
starts. . . . The loss of starts, which then would result into an income stream over three or
four years." (R. 3335.)
8
"The decline of the morale. The struggle.5' (R. 3335.) "Thfre was economic damage,
certainly, and also damage to morale at the campuses affected." (R. 3334.)

7

Second, the fact that expert testimony is not required to prove such damages
explains why Stevens-Henager provided non-expert testimony in opposing summary
judgment and then cited that non-expert testimony to the district court at the summary
judgment hearing. (R. 3332-35; 3574:13-14.) While counsel for Stevens-Henager stated
at the summary judgment hearing that damages related to "the decline in enrollment"
would be difficult to calculate without expert testimony, just a page later counsel states
that Stevens-Henager had outlined its damages "in the depositions of Mr. Barney,
Ms. Gastigar, Mr. Moss, of Ms. Dewsnup," the very non-expert testimony set forth in the
opposition to the summary judgment motion. (R. 3574:13-14.) Stevens-Henager
therefore did not concede that all damages required expert testimony. The fact that
expert testimony is not required to establish all damages is fatal to Eagle Gate's
argument, as the non-expert testimony is more than sufficient to establish that Eagle
Gate's conduct proximately caused damage to Stevens-Henager.
Because Eagle Gate's motion for summary judgment was fashioned to address
only whether Stevens-Henager had suffered "any damages," when Stevens-Henager
provides some evidence of damages, the motion should have been denied in its entirety.
When the non-expert testimony is construed in the light most favorable to StevensHenager, the testimony is sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact concerning
damages. This court should reverse the order granting summary judgment to permit
Stevens-Henager to present evidence of its damages to a jury.

8

II.

In Light of the Erroneous Summary Judgment Ruling, This Court Should
Allow the District Court to Reconsider Its (i) Dismissal of CFAA Claims;
(ii) Exclusion of Evidence of Damages at Trial; and (iii) Striking of an Expert
Report on Damages
If this court reverses the trial court's grant of summary judgment, it also should

reverse subsequent orders based, at least in part, upon the gr^nt of summary judgment.
McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Since the partial summary
judgment set into play the entire chain of subsequent proceedings, we also reverse all
subsequent orders and judgments and remand the case for triftl."). Eagle Gate argues that
this court should affirm those orders on independent grounds because the subsequent
orders were only based "in part" on the order granting summary judgment. (Resp. Br. at
38-43.) In essence, Eagle Gate asks this court to presume th^t the district court would
have reached the same results absent the summary judgment brder, even though the
district court cited the summary judgment order as a basis for those results. If the district
court would have reached the same result, then the district co^irt can do so if Eagle Gate
renews its motions on remand and allows the district court to decide that issue for itself.
As outlined in the opening brief, there are three subsequent orders based upon the
trial court's summary judgment ruling. In the first order entered on May 30, 2008, the
district court granted Eagle Gate's motion to strike the report|of Stevens-Henager's
damages expert "[b]ased on the Court's prior rulings," including the rulings on Eagle
Gate's motion for summary judgment and Stevens-Henager'sj motion to reconsider the
order granting summary judgment. (R. 3994.) Because the district court struck an expert
report, (R. 3994), and previously denied Stevens-Henager's request for an extension to
provide that expert report, (R. 3566), the district court should be permitted to reconsider
its ruling in light of this court's decision issued today in Welsfr v. Hospital Corp. of Utah,
9

2010 UT App 171,

P.3d

(holding that trial court abused its discretion in excluding

expert testimony for failure to submit a timely expert report). Thus, not only should the
district court reconsider the May 30, 2008 order in the absence of the erroneous summary
judgment order, it also should reconsider that order in light of the standards set forth in
Welsh.
The second and third orders were both entered on August 31, 2009. In the second
order, the district court granted Eagle Gate's motion in limine to exclude any evidence of
monetary damages—a motion necessary only because there is evidence of monetary
damages-—on the ground that the remaining prayer for injunctive relief does not require
proof of damages, and therefore, evidence of monetary damages is irrelevant. (R. 4368.)
And in the third order, the district court dismissed Stevens-Henager's claim for injunctive
relief and attorney fees under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act on the ground that
Stevens-Henager could not prove damages totaling at least $5,000, a requirement under
CFAA. (R. 4366.)
The August 31, 2009 orders deserve particular attention because they are
necessarily based on the summary judgment ruling that dismissed Stevens-Henager's
damages remedy for all claims. Eagle Gate argues that the absence of expert testimony
concerning damages, not summary judgment on Stevens-Henager5 s damages remedy,
explains why the district court precluded any evidence of damages at trial. (Resp. Br. at
43.) Frankly, this argument makes no sense. The exclusion of expert testimony, or, more
precisely, the striking of an expert report, does not compel the exclusion of non-expert
testimony at trial. Non-expert testimony, by definition, does require an expert.

10

Eagle Gate also argues that the district court did not dismiss the CFAA claims
because damages were no longer in play, even though the district court expressly states
that it dismissed those claims because Stevens-Henager could not make a threshold
showing that it suffered at least $5,000 in damages. (Resp. Br. at 43-44.) Of course,
there is no basis for concluding before trial that Stevens-Henager's damages will not total
more than $5,000, and this court should reject Eagle Gate's unsupported assertion to the
contrary. This court should refuse to speculate about what damages the jury will award
based upon the non-expert testimony.
Because the subsequent orders are based on the district court's grant of summary
judgment, if this court reverses the order granting summary judgment, this court also
should vacate these subsequent orders, without prejudice, to permit the district court to
consider them in the absence of its summary judgment ruling. If Eagle Gate is correct
that those orders rest upon independent grounds, then the district court can make the
determination on remand.
Conclusion
In the end, this appeal is very simple. Stevens-Henager provided evidence that it
suffered damages as a result of Eagle Gate's illegal conduct. Because there is a disputed
issue of fact concerning damages, this court should vacate th^ order granting summary
judgment to Eagle Gate. And because three subsequent ordei+s were based upon the
erroneous summary judgment ruling, this court should vacate those orders as well to
permit the district court to consider its rulings in the absence Of the summary judgment
ruling. This court should reverse.

11

DATED this 24th day of June, 2010.
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
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